are very far from having reached agreement in the interpretation of the facts; and most of these medical authors, in attempting to interpret the facts, seem to vacillate uncertainly between a number of rival and illdefined hypotheses, in a way which reveals a lack of sufficient consideration of the more general problems-of life and mind. And'among the academic psychologists the state of affairs is still worse. The medical investigators might fairly have turned to the standard works on psychology, in the expectation of finding somle authoritative statement of the nature of instinct in general, and of its role in human life. But if any have done so they must in the main have been sadly disappointed. They will have found some descriptions of instinctive behaviour in animals, and a general agreement to the effect that animals behave instinctively; but the most industrious study of the leading treatises on the human mind would have left the medical inquirer astonished at the lack of agreement, and perhaps still more astonished to find that very few of the recognized authorities on normal psychology assign any important place to in §tinct in human life or attempt to grapple with the problems of sex. He would probably have arrived at the conclusion that the consensus of opinion (so far .as any consensus exists) regards instinct in man as responsible only for some of the early modes of bodily activity of the infant; and that, according to the best opinion, when the student of the human mind has recognized these simple facts, he may dismiss the notion of instinct and proceed to show how intelligence or reason has completely supplanted instinct in the governance of human conduct. Even William James, who alone among the leading psychologists of the nineteenth century seems to me to have made any adequate recognition of the human instincts, hardly touched on sex, and hardly attempted to bring his many true and penetrating observations on instinct in human life into intelligible relation with what he had to say of volition, attention, feeling, and imagination; and if Professor Stout may now be reckoned among the exceptional few who recognize human instincts as involving anything more than certain simple motor aptitudes, that has been only since the recent publication of the third edition of his excellent " Manual." Yet it is difficult to suppose that even the purest psychologist could avoid seeing the essential points of similarity between the sex-behaviour of animals and that of men, if his attention could be drawn to the more obvious of the facts.
-Two of the great psychological errors, two of the classical errors of psychology, still have sufficient vitality to retard very seriously our progress towards a true and generally accepted theory-namely,
(1) the error that instinctive action is merely compound reflex action.;
(2) the error of psychological hedonism, the doctrine that pleasure and pain are the prime movers of all human and animal behaviour. The combined influence of these two errors is discernible in much of the discussion of the problems of sex (even in the discussions of those who recognize that the human species possesses a sexual instinct) and determines the most widely held conception of the sexual functions. According to this most widely held conception, peripherally excited sensations, which are said to possess or to be endowed with plea'surable or painful feeling tone, excite by way of reflex action the fundamental sex-activities, and all the complications of human sexual life arise through the intellectualization of the desire to get rid of the disagreeable sensations, and to prolong or renew the pleasurable sensations. The simplest form of this doctrine regards the pressure of the seminal fluid upon the walls of the vesiculw seminales as the stimulus that excites disagreeable sensations, which in turn excite to copulatory movements; and it regards the pleasurable sensations which result from such movements as prolonging the bodily activity, and as giving rise to the desire for their renewal. But there seems to be a strong tincture of the same errors in the doctrine of "erogenous zones" of Freud and others, according to which the sex-organ proper is only primus inter pares, a number of sensory surfaces being endowed with similar potentialities.
The inadequacy of any such doctrine becomes obvious as soon as we ask how it can account for the attraction of one sex to the other (to say nothing of all the higher manifestations of sexual love which are rooted in this attraction). For it is committed to the proposition that the male is attracted by the female (and conversely) because he, in one way or another, acquires the knowledge that the sex-organs of the female are instruments better suited than any others for enabling him to get rid of his disagreeable sensations, and to enjoy the pleasurable sensations that result from appropriate stimulation of his own sexorgans. The ridiculous inadequacy of explanations of this kind should be sufficient refutation of all those allied doctrines which may be classed together as the " sense-stimulus theories " of sex.
At this point I will adduce only one or two of -many convincing arguments against all these " sense-stimulus -theories." It is a wellknown fact that many women are entirely frigid in sexual relations, experiencing neither pleasure nor passion, in spite of repeated stimulation of all erogenous zones. Yet such a woman may, perhaps after years of married life, have her sex-instinct effectively aroused, and -become a passionate lover, knowing both the pleasure and the satisfaction of yielding to a passionate impulse, and also the pain of -unsatisfied desire rooted in the same impulse. This and similar facts show clearly enough that the sense-pleasure is not the cause of the impulse, but that the strong impulse is the ground of the pleasure which -attends its operation; and indeed it seems clear that the intensity of the satisfaction or pleasure that attends the indulgence of the sex-impulse runs parallel with the strength of the impulse as felt and manifested before the gratification begins. The falsity of the sense-pleasure theory, and of all the theories which see in the peripheral factors, such as stimulation of the glans penis, distension of the vesiculai seminales, or internal secretions of the sex-glands, the essential conditions of sexual activity, is further shown by the fact that in some cases the sexual instinct continues to make itself felt with but little modification after complete castration.'
The error common to all these "sense-stimulus " theories is that, failing altogether to grasp the essential facts of instinct, they conceive the innate basis of the sexual life altogether too narrowly. More common is the attribution to the sex-instinct of each and every manifestation of love or affection, not only of love between adult persons of opposite sex, but also of the affection of parent to child and of child to parent, of children to one another, of man to man, and of man, woman or child to any animal; and some authors even go so far as to attribute to it every trace of whatever can be called altruism. This, perhaps, is the most serious error that pervades much of the contemporary literature of sex. The error, as it seems to me, arises in the first place from the failure to distinguish between the sentiment of love for any object or person and the emotions and impulses that we experience from moment to moment, of which some are, and some are not. round for the utterly unscientific procedure of lumping together a number-of other distinct tendencies which make for the preservation of the life of the individual under the head of an assumed "instinct of self-preservation." The tendency of the parental instinct is primarily to protect and cherish the young offspring. In the animals its distinctness from the sex-instinct is generally obvious; the two instincts operate at different periods of the life-cycle and quite independently of one another.; the males of many species seem to be devoid of the parental instinct, though their sex-instinct may be very powerful in its due season.
There are three principal reasons for the confounding by many writers of the manifestations of these two instincts in human beings. First, the two instincts are normally combined in the sentiment of sexual love for any person. It is notorious that in many women the maternal element is very prominent in their love for their husband or lover. And it is no less obvious that the same tender emotion and the same protective impulse (which are the essential manifestations of the parental instinct) are elements in the normal love of man for woman. And, if any one instinct is an essential ingredient of all love, it is this parental instinct. A great authority has told us that " pity is akin to love," thus concisely expressing the truth that pity is essentially that tender protective impulse (though tinged in pity with sympathetic distress) which, when it becomes habitually directed towards any one object, is the main element of the sentiment of love.
A second ground of this confusion is intimately related to the former-namely, it would seem that there is in the constitution of normal human nature some degree of innate connexion between the sexual and the parental or protective instinct; such that the excitement of the sex-instinct by the presence of any person, and its direction towards that person, are very apt to be accompanied or immediately followed by the excitement of the protective instinct, and its direction towards the same person. ;sided, so that while the excitement of the sex-instinct tends naturally to lead on to the excitement of the protective, that of the protective has no such natural tendency to awaken the sex-impulse. Certainly, I can discover no reason of any weight for regarding the normal love of a mother (or of a father) for the child as comprising any sexual element; hor can I see any ground for recognizing such an element in the normal affection of a child for its parents; but to that question I shall have to keturn.
The third reason for this common failure to distinguish the operations of the protective from the sex-instinct is that the bodily manifestations (or natural tendencies to expression in bodily movement) of the two instincts -are in certain respects very similar-namely, both impel to close bodily contact with and to embracing of the person to whom they are directed. Yet, in spite of partial coincidence in respect of the actions which they prompt, the actual ends in which the two impulses find their satisfaction are quite distinct, and the emotions which accompany the two modes of behaviour are very different. The parental or protective impulse is concerned pnly for the welfare of its object, it is wholly altruistic; and the quality of its emotion, the tender emotion, is one of the most distinctive and easily recognizable of all the qualities of emotion. The sexual impulse, on the other hand, when evoked in its crude primary form-i.e., not qualified and redeemed by the protective impulse-appears as sheer lust, which, as is generally recognized, is utterly and brutally regardless of the welfare of the object to which it is directed.
Other manifestations erroneously attributed to the sex-instinct by mnany authors are modesty (especially the feminine coyness), jealousy, and masochistic and sadistic tendencies. All these, I subnmit, are attributable to other instincts, rather than to alleged "components" of the sex-instinct. I have not time to attempt to show the instinctive roots of all these; I will only throw out the suggestion that sadism and masochism are due to the cooperation with the sex-impulse in abnormally intense degree of two entirely different instinctive tendencies-namely, the tendencies to self-assertion or display on the one hand, and to selfabasement on the other. Both these tendencies are -normally brought into play in all personal intercourse. In sexual intercourse between persons who have acquired the sentiment of love for one another, they are kept in check by the impulse of the tender emotion. But where the sexual impulse operates without this check it is apt to be complicated .71 by one or both of these two impulses in great strength; for to inflict pain upon, to domineer brutally over, the partner in the sexual act yields the intensest gratification to the impulse of self-assertion; and passively to submit to brutalities brings the greatest satisfaction to the impulse of self-abasement. The cultivation of these gratifications is, I submit, the essence of sadism and of masochism; and in this way, without regarding them as " components " of the sexual instinct, we may explain whatever truth there is in the statement that all men exhibit traces of these tendencies.'
In a similar way, jealousy, modesty, coyness, and other alleged components of the sexual instinct may be shown to be rooted in distinct instincts, and to be exhibited in other relations than the sexual. And it is to be noted that the unjustifiable assumption that these and other tendencies are components of the sexual instinct leads, by way of an argument in a circle, to an undue extension of the sphere of sexuality. For those who are obsessed with the sex-theory, having made this unwarranted assumption, find in it their justification for seeing in every manifestation of love, of tenderness, of modesty, of jealousy, of cruelty, and of subordination, such as that of the hypnotic subject to the operator, and even in curiosity, evidence of the sexuality of the relations in which these tendencies appear.
The Freudian doctrine is peculiar in that while exaggerating the sphere of sex in this way, it extends it also by regarding the sexual instinct (inconsistently enough) as essentially the pleasure reflex from the sex-organs, and by then representing other pleasure-bringing activities of a very simple nature, such as thumb-sucking, or rhythmic swaying of the body, as somehow mysteriously connected with the sexual In support of this suggestion I cite the following passages from the autobiography of a literary man who seems to have been an indisputable instance of innate inversion. Referring to a sexual incident, in the course of which his partner thrashed him, he wrote: " One of the few pleasurable memories this intimacy, extending over years, has left for me is that moment of abject abasement to one who, with no warmth of feeling, had yet once had sufficient energy to be brutal to me. It must have been from this incident that the calculated effect of flagellation began to have weight with me when I indulged my imagination.
A wish to be repulsed, trampled, violated by the object of my passion took hold of my instincts . . . My enjoyment now was to imagine myself forced to undergo physical humiliation and submission to the caprice of my male captors." Of his relations with another brutal youth he wrote: " I was conscious that he experienced sexual pleasure . . . and, thougi loathing him, I would, after I had suffered from his kicks, throw myself into his imaginary embraces and indulge in a perfect rage of abject submission." Writing of the masochistic tendency, Havelock Ellis (from whose book I cite the foregoing passages) says: " Such a state of feeling is by some regarded as almost normal in women." (" Psychology of Sex: Sexual Inversion," ii, pp. 95, 100, 105.) impulse just because they are attended by pleasure: a conclusion which would be justified only if we accepted the obviously false premise that all pleasure is sexual in nature.
I will not delay to examine the doctrine' that the sexual instinct really comprises two distinct impulses (detumescence and contrectation); I will only point out that the principal ground for this view is found in the facts which Havelock Ellis groups under the head of auto-erotism; yet, as is generally recognized, this auto-erotism is commonly a pseudoauto-erotism, the imagination supplying the object towards which the sexual excitement is directed. The strong impulse of the sex-instinct is a primary fact of our innate constitution-i.e., like every instinct, the sex-instinct of man involves as its most essential constituent a strong tendency or impulse to bodily and mental activity, a conative disposition, a great spring of psycho-physical energy. Since in man it comes into operation only when the individual has acquired large power of intelligent and voluntary control of bodily movement, it is impossible to say in what degree the actions to which it impels are defined in the constitution of the instinct; but the general character of these innately prescribed actions seems clear, namely, approach to the object which excites the instinct, followed by close bodily contact, and the specifically sexual movements; that is to say, like many other instincts, it impels not merely to some one simple action, but to a train of actions which naturally succeed one another as the situation develops. But that is no reason for regarding the instinct as compounded of, or as comprising, two or more specific impulses; the whole train of actions is rather to be regardedc as carried out under the driving power of the one impulse, as energized from the one source, the conative disposition of the instinct.2 Of any such conative disposition we can offer no further explanation than to say that it is one of the primary differentiations of the will, or of the power of striving, which is the fundamental attribute of living things. In its operation it is not dependent upon pleasure or pain; for though pleasurable and painful 'Propounded and defended by Dr. A. Moll in his " Untersuchungen uber die Libido Sexualis," and in his " Sexual Life of the Child." 2 Havelock Ellis rightly insists (supporting the contention with a wealth of facts) that both in animals and in man, under natural conditions, the activities which Moll ascribes to the impulse of contrectation normally precede the more specifically sexual actions which that autihor ascribes to the impulse of detumescence. being in fact necessary for the production of the state of tumescence which is presupposed by the activities of detumescence (op. cit., iii, p. 45).
experiences may modify it to some extent, it may, and often does, override and defy thie natural promptings of pleasure and pain.
On its efferent oir executive side, then, the sex-instinct is complex. I wish now to insist that it is complex also on its afferent or receptive side.
Physiologists (and many psychologists also) are wont to assume that each instinct is normally excited through some quite simple senseimpression or stimulus; for this is a natural corollary of the dogma that instinct is essentially reflex action. But the animals afford many illustrations of the fact that purely instinctive action inay be initiated by perception of a complex object, bv an act of perception which involves the synthetic apprehension of a manifold of sense-stinmuli. That fact should prepare us to accept the view which seems to me indisputably correct-namely, that the perception by the eye of the human form is one, and the principal one, of several innately provided roads of excitement of the sex-instinct. And not only so; but also we are, I submit, compelled to believe that the instinct is differentiated in the two sexes on its afferent side; in such a way that for the normal male the presentation of the female form is an effective excitant, for the female that of the male form.
I am fully aware that in laying down these propositions I am going far beyond the generally accepted views as to the character and extent of our innate mental endowment. I shall be told by shocked colleagues that I am seeking to reintroduce the discredited principle of innate ideas. That reproach will leave me quite unnoved. I will merely point out that there is a difference, perhaps of degree only, between anything that can be called an innate idea and an innate disposition for the perception of a particular kind of complex object, such as, I suggest, forms the principal afferent channel of the human sex-instinct. I will adduce only three arguments in support of this proposition:
(1) The perfectly innocent boy (ignorant of all facts of sex, and who has never experienced excitation through or in the sex-organs) feels the mysterious and powerful attraction and the emotional significance of the female form.
(2) The development in man and throughout the higher animals of secondary sex characters that appeal to the eye implies, as its necessary correlate, the corresponding development of this innate capacity for the apprehension of these secondary sex-characters, and for the visual discrimination of the two sexes, and the instinctive sex-reaction to the one sex only; for without such innate power of perceptual discrimination and discriminative reaction, all those secondary sex-characters which differentiate the outward appearance of the two sexes of so many species would be of no biological utility.
(3) In no other way can we account for the fact that the male is sexually attracted by the female, the female by the male. This is not a matter of experience. Consider for a moment the most notable attempt to explain the fact of this specific direction of the sex-impulse to the opposite sex as a product of individual experience-namely, that of Freud. Freud tells us that the direction of the man's sex-impulse towards wonman is determined by the sexual pleasure he experiences in taking milk from his mother's breast. I will not dilate upon the extravagance of this suggestion. I will merely ask, How then does the sex-impulse of woman become directed towards the male? The only consistent answer open to Freud is to assert that it is through pleasurable experiences of the female infant connected with her father's genital organs-an answer which is more manifestly absurd than the suggested explanation of the male's attraction by the female. One might add that, if this fantastic notion of Freud's were true, we should find among the rising generation a majority of both sexes whose sex-impulse was directed primarily to feeding-bottles; the feeding-bottle must be fast becoming an almost universal 'fetish-object.
Woman in fact would be but one of many fetish objects for man, and man for woman.
One might add in general that sexual inversion and perversion would necessarily be far commoner than they are, if Freud's notion were true. On the view I suggest, the frequency of acquired inversion is easily understood as a consequence of the relatively slight differentiation of the external sex-characters of the human species; and this view is in full harmony with the fact that those male inverts whose peculiarity is clearly due, in part at least, to experience, are most commonly attracted by youths who exhibit many points of external resemblance to the female type.
It may be added that if it can be shown that sexual inversion is in some cases congenital (and many authorities of great experience, notably Moll, Kraft-Ebbing, and Havelock Ellis, are convinced of -this) we should have in this fact further decisive evidence in support of the view I take.
AGE AT WHICH MATURATION OF THE SEX-INSTINCT NORMALLY OCCURS.
Under this head I have to criticize the Freudian view which attributes active sexuality to the young infant. I have already shown reason for rejecting some of the grounds on which this attribution is made, and have rejected others by implication, including the whole doctrine of infantile erogenous zones, which is bound up with the pleasurable sense-stimulus theory of sex. If we ask what direct evidence is advanced in support of this doctrine of infantile sexuality, it appears, so far as I have been able to become acquainted with it, to be of the flimsiest kind.
It is to be expected on general biological grounds that the date of coming into action of the sex-instinct should be subject to wide variations; and so it is possible that in some cases of infantile masturbation we really have to do with a sexual activity; but if so, there is very good reason for regarding these cases as abnormal and quite exceptional cases of premature maturation, paralleled by rare cases of infantile development of the secondary sex-characters. It must be admitted also that occasional erection of the penis is not very uncommon in infants. But I have satisfied myself by careful observation that this is, in some cases at least, a purely physiological condition, having no mental accompaniment or significance.
Freud assumes certain common infantile activities, such as sucking the. breast and thumb-sucking, to be essentially sexual, and to yield sexual pleasure. But as having occurred about that age; my own retrospection agrees with this, and emphatically denies any earlier stirrings. But perhaps of more importance is the fact that in-a number of these autolbiographical accounts it appears that the subject clearly remembers having been subjected in childhood (in some cases as late as the tenth year) to the attempts of others to excite him sexually, and that these attempts proved wholly unsuccessful, although a few years later the sexual impulse manifested itself in full strength. Now Freud puts aside all this positive evidence by asserting that there normally occurs repression of all mnemories of infantile sex-experience; but he offers no good reason why this alleged amnesia should extend just over the period in which all objective signs of sexuality are normally lacking. This is a coincidence which urgently demands explanation by those who accept the Freudian views.
But there is other evidence bearing on this question, which, though indirect, is,i I believe, trustworthy-namely, the evidence afforded by bashfulness. I have offered an analysis of bashfulness, which I believe to be substantially correct'-namely, that it is essentially a struggle between the two opposed tendencies of self-display and self-abasement, each being a primary instinctive tendency. Whatever accentuates selfconsciousness tends to evoke these two tendencies; and the stirring of the sex-impulse produces this effect in the highest degree, because it essentially demands the approach of the self to other personalities. Now bashfulness is not confined to sexual situations only; it is displayed often enough independently of all sex-stirrings, and by young children. But the evidential point to which I wish to draw your attention is this: Young children, say at 3 or 4 years of age, often exhibit strong attachments either to persons of their own age or to elders, and to those of their own or the opposite sex. Since the question-begging term "love" is applied to such attachments, the Freudians regard themselves as justified in seeing in them expressions of sexuality. Now, it is characteristic of these infantile attachments that the display of affection is generally made in the most unreserved and open manner without any trace of bashfulness. But'in the boy and girl attractions, which are so common a little later-i.e., in children aged 8 and upwards-bashfulness complicates the relation and not uncommonly absolutely dominates the scene, especially as far as the boy is concernied, so that the'outward manifestations of the strong attraction he feels are apt to be completely Instinctive action is, in my view, prompted by instinctive desire, by which I mean a desire that wells up spontaneously in the consciousness from the inherent activity of the organism by which it is felt. Instinctive action is, on my hypothesis, not necessarily reflex-some instinctive actions are reflex, but many are not. Acts have two sources of origin. Some are elicited by the stimulus of circumstances on the organism; others are actuated by the inherent energy of the organism, which gradually accumulates until it reaches a tension or potential that breaks down the resistance to its escape and finds expression in action. The rush of the spider to the part of its web that has entangled a fly is strictly reflex. It is instantly evoked by the stimulus of the vibration of the web by the vibration of the fly's wing, and if this vibration is imitated by touching the web with a live tuning-fork, the spider can be infallibly drawn as many times as we care to repeat the experiment: and without this stimulus the action never takes place. But the song of the lark needs no stimulus to evoke it. The brain of the lark gradually accumulates a store of energy that increases and increases until it breaks down the resistance that opposes its escape, and finds its way out in soaring and in song. No stimulus from without is needed. The action is not reflex, but spontaneous. It is not elicited, -it is autogenetic. But it is instinctive. It is just as instinctive as the rush of the spider, for the action is predetermined by the structure of the nervous system and other organs of the lark, and, given the accumulation of energy to the bursting point, that is the way provided by the organization of the bird for the energy to make its escape.
There is a class of instincts intermediate between the purely reflex and the purely spontaneous. These are spontaneous in as far as the desire to perform the act arises in the mind without the provocation of stimulus, but the act needs for its performance external circumstances of a special nature. The animal or bird of prey goes out to seek its food under no stimulus from without,. but solely by reason of the promptings of hunger. Its search for food is an instinctive act, but it is not a reflex act. It does not pounce upon its prey, however, unless and until it receives through its sense-organs the stimulus. of the presence of prey in its environment. As soon as the stimulus is applied, the appropriate reflex is made, and the animal pounces. Now, notice that if the internal tension is great, the reflex may be elicited by a stimulus that is inappropriate, that is not the normal stimulus, but is something only distantly resembling it, as when a kitten pounces on a reel of cotton. We do not find that an old cat pounces on a reel of cotton. This is because, in the old animal, the potential of energy is not so high. In the kitten it is superabundant, as it is in most young animals. Moreover, we find that when the potential is high, the mere action necessary to attain the end instinctively desired is not enough to satisfy-not enough, that is to say, to use up sufficient energy to lower the potential to the satisfaction point; and so the kitten is not contented merely to catch and eat the mouse, it must first play with it.
The sexual instinct is an instinct of this nature. It is spontaneous inasmuch as the desire is original and needs no stimulus to evoke it. The male goes out to seek the female, as the bird of prey goes out to seek its food, solely by reason of the prompting of desire. It is an instinctive act, but it is not a reflex act. There is no embrace, however, until the stimulus of the presence of the female is experienced, just as there is no pounce by the bird of prey until the stimulus of its quarry is received. When the energy is of high potential, as indicated by the intensity of desire, a very inappropriate stimulus may, in the one case as in the other, evoke the act; and as the kitten will pounce on a reel of cotton or on its own tail, so will the matli embrace; Section of Psychiatry 83 an animal or indulge in masturbation. Lastly, as the kitten will not merely catch the mouse but also play with it, so the man in satisfaction of excessive sexual desire will indulge in masochistic, sadistic, and other practices. I agree with Dr. McDougall that these are not normal components of the sexual instinct. I should have thought that their abnormal quality was manifest on the face of them. They are as abnormal, and often as cruel, as the kitten's practice of playing with the mouse before eating it, aud they have the same origin in excessive and perverted desire that fails to obtain satisfaction by the normal process.
Dr. ERNEST JONES sent the following contribution1: The value of a discussion of any definition of the sexual instinct lies rather in the light it may throw on the general theory of the subject, than in the elucidation of any particular formula. The tendency to define may be too exclusively insisted on, and would then bring greater disadvantage than advantage. This is particularly the case with a newv science, such as sexuology must still be called, for it is important that any definitions arrived at should not be pedantic or exert a cramping influence on an expanding body of knowledge. The need for the definition of the sexual instinct is not so urgent as has sometimes been claimed; psycho-analysts, for instance, are often asked to define the sense in which they use the word "sexual," but in point of fact they use it in no special sense of their own. They designate a process, mental or physical, as sexual when it is accompanied by certain specific sensations that are familiar to every normal adult, and concerning which no misunderstanding is likely to arise. When Freud says, for example, that a given process in childhood is of a sexual nature, he is not using the word in any original or peculiar sense, but wishes to convey precisely what he says-namely, that the process in question is accompanied by these specific sensations. A misunderstanding in this respect appears to arise rather from a neglect of the current everyday connotation of the word, with an unwarranted deflection of it in terms of some particular philosophical, biological or ethical theory. The sexual instinct is frequently regarded as synonymous with a somewbat hypothetical "reproductive instinct," such plain facts as those of masturbation and homosexuality being ignored; a narrowing of this sort is clearly unjustifiable as, being directly contradicted by our experience. Considerations along these lines should also make one guard against an identification of the words "sexual" and "genital," or regard a sexual act as one that necessarily concerns the genital organs.
Freud makes the useful distinction between the numerous mental and physical processes that normally are purely preparatory, and those constituting the culminating act of gratification; he designates those of the form-er class by the term "fore-pleasure" and those of the latter by the term "endpleasure." End-pleasure processes usually concern the genital organs, but do not necessarily. Fore-pleasure processes are for the most part not concerned with those organs, but refer to a great variety of other functions, such as those of the eye (excitation through beauty), the ear (excitation by the sound of the voice), touch that masturbates to the point of orgasm we have to recognize sexuality, but it seems equally clear that such an infant is profoundly abnormal, or at any rate unusual; for the sex-instinct does not achieve this climax of activity in a large proportion of normal women until they have had a considerable experience of sexual intercourse. But it is by no means clear tlhat the erection of, or the playing with, the penis of male infants implies the operation of the sexual instinct. As regards erection, this is often an incident of early infancy which is not repeated in the later years of infancy, and is, therefore, not continuous with adult sexual erections. Further, it is well known that erections occasionally occur in adults, which seem to be purely physiological, like those of infancy-i.e., which have no mental accompaniment of sex-feeling and excitement, and which, therefore, we ought not to regard as implying any activity of the sex-instinct. Nor do I think that all playing with the penis on the part of male infants can safely be regarded as a sexual manifestation. It seems to me inevitable that (apart from all sex-feeling) so prominent and peculiar a bodily appendage should be an object of curiosity to children, and that some of them should acquire the trick of handling it, just as they acquire other objectionable tricks. And it is, at least, as legitimate to doubt the sexuality of many such masturbation-like acts, as to follow Freud in regarding as sexual every instance of thumb-sucking, and of playing with the nose, ears, hair, &c. As regards the little boys who delight to make water publicly on the street (to whom Dr. Eder refers as evidencing infantile sexuality), I suggest that the shameless way in which they do this affords positive evidence of lack of sexuality; and the fact that the urchin does this with a manifest bravado, as of one who defies the conventions, does not, I submit, militate against this view. In citing such actions as evidence of sexuality Dr. Eder illustrates once again the inevitable tendency of the Freudians in this direction. I think we are justified, both inductively and deductively, in laying down the general rule that the stronger is the sexual impulse (other things being the same) the more reserved is the individual in speech and action concerning sex matters; and that, conversely, the complete lack of reserve which characterizes most young children and some adults implies the lack of the sex-impulse. Dr. Mercier complains that I do not seem to be acquainted with his book on "Conduct," in which he claims to have refuted for the first time the reflex action doctrine of instinct. I would assure him that I have read the book, and would inform him that I myself had published, some three years before the appearance of his volume on " Conduct," a book (" Social Psychology ") in which I had anticipated all or most of his statements about instinct that are both true and important, while avoiding what seem to me certain errors in his treatment of the subject.
